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When God and Costco Battle for a City’s Soul: Can 
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act Fairly Adjudicate Both Sides in Land Use 
Disputes? 
Mark Spykerman* 
 
Imagine a city denying a special use permit to construct a church 
so that the city can condemn property and clear space for a Costco.1 
Imagine a resident of a quiet suburban neighborhood hosting 
religious worship activities for hundreds of people at her home, 
disturbing the quiet residential lifestyle neighbors have come to 
expect.2 Natural sympathies and notions of fairness rest with the 
church in the first example and with the neighbors whose lives have 
been disrupted in the second example. However, the same federal 
law, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 
2000 (RLUIPA),3 has been used to protect churches from cities with 
big-box-retailer dreams, as well as to protect neighbors with non-
traditional religious practices from cities trying to preserve a quiet 
residential environment. 
As part of a longstanding community right, local governments 
enforce land use decisions through their recognized police power of 
promoting the general health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.4 
Historically, courts uphold local land use decisions as long as they 
appear to serve the public interest and the chosen means were 
 * J.D. (2005), Washington University School of Law. 
 1. See Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redev. Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203 
(C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 2. See Murphy v. Zoning Comm’n of New Milford, 223 F. Supp. 2d 377 (D. Conn. 
2002). 
 3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2000). Commentators have questioned the 
constitutionality of the law, while groups such as the ACLU have praised it for its contributions 
to religious freedom. Frank T. Santoro, Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 493, 494 (2002).  
 4. Local land use decisions are presumed constitutional. Goldblatt v. Town of 
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 596 (1962). 
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reasonably necessary to serve the designated purpose without being 
unduly oppressive.5  
However, what happens if a local government’s decision appears 
to satisfy constitutional minimums of reasonableness, but 
nonetheless, prevents a religious institution from exercising its 
religious freedoms? Congress, relying on its spending and commerce 
powers as well as the enforcement provision of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,6 sought to preserve religious exercise by passing the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993 (RFRA)7 and then 
RLUIPA in 2000.8 
This Note will examine RLUIPA as an approach to the balancing 
of religious freedom and the desire for well planned communities. 
Part I examines the history and legislative intent of RLUIPA’s 
predecessors, including the RFRA. Part II examines the legislative 
history and case law of RLUIPA. Part III analyzes the fairness of 
using RLUIPA to adjudicate land use decisions involving religious 
uses. Additionally, Part III proposes a judicial construction of 
RLUIPA that allows the Act to be invoked to protect religious 
freedom, but still recognizes the superiority and need for local control 
over land use decisions.  
I. CONGRESS RECOGNIZES A NEED FOR GREATER PROTECTION OF 
RELIGIOUS EXERCISE AND ACTS 
The trigger point to Congress’s recent interest in religious 
protection was the Supreme Court’s opinion in Employment Division 
v. Smith.9 In that case, the Court was presented with a state law that 
 5. See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894). This rule has been extended to 
zoning ordinances. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (holding 
zoning ordinances valid unless “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial 
relation to the public health safety, morals, or general welfare”). 
 6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3 & amend. XIV, § 5.  
 7. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000)). The RFRA sought to apply strict scrutiny to all laws that 
substantially burden religious exercise. § 2000bb(b)(1). The Act has since been ruled 
unconstitutional. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).  
 8. 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statements of Sen. Kennedy and 
Sen. Hatch). 
 9. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). For a 
summary of Smith as well as the Supreme Court’s free exercise jurisprudence leading up to the 
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denied individuals their unemployment benefits because of their 
sacramental peyote use.10 The individuals claimed that peyote use 
was sacramental for members of their Native American Church and 
that the law interfered with his constitutional right to free religious 
exercise.11 The Oregon Supreme Court held that the prohibition of 
sacramental peyote use violated the Free Exercise Clause.12 However, 
the U.S. Supreme Court13 refused to accept the Free Exercise Clause 
argument and held that the clause cannot, by itself, be used to 
“relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and 
neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law 
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or 
proscribes).’”14 Upset with this holding, Congress began work on 
legislation to effectively overturn Smith15 as evidenced by the 
enactment of both the RZUIPA and RFRA. 
A. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
The ruling in Smith had the effect of denying constitution-based 
religious exemptions from generally applicable, neutral laws.16 
Unhappy that the holding weakened religious exercise protection, 
Congress passed the RFRA, explicitly announcing in its findings that 
“laws ‘neutral’ toward religion may burden religious exercise as 
surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise” and that 
decision, see GREGG IVERS, LOWERING THE WALL 79–93 (1990).  
 10. 494 U.S. at 874. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Smith v. Employment Div., 763 P.2d 146 (Or. 1988).  
 13. Justices Rehnquist, White, Stevens, Stevens, and Kennedy joined Justice Scalia’s 
majority opinion. However, Justices Brennan and Marshall joined Blackmun in a dissenting 
opinion. 
 14. 494 U.S. at 879 (citations omitted). The Court noted that  
[t]he only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application 
of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not 
the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other 
constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press. 
Id. at 881. The effect of this holding was to only require a rational relationship test to generally 
applicable laws that may burden religious exercise. S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 7–8 (1993), 
reprinted in 1993 U.S.S.C.A.N. 1892, 1897. 
 15. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15.3 (5th ed. 
2000). 
 16. Id. § 17.6. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p291 Spykerman book pages.doc  11/2/2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
294 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 18:291 
 
 
 
this law was meant to overrule Smith on the matter.17 Additionally, 
the RFRA provided that the state and federal governments cannot 
“substantially burden” an individual’s exercise of religion even if the 
law is neutral and generally applicable, unless the government 
demonstrates that the burden imposed furthers a compelling 
governmental interest and is the least restrictive alternative.18 The Act 
specifically calls for a reinstatement of the compelling interest test 
used in Sherbert v. Verner19 and Wisconsin v. Yoder20 and guarantees 
application of the test in all cases where free exercise of religion is 
substantially burdened.21 Effectively, Congress imposed a strict 
scrutiny22 level of judicial review on any government action that 
substantially burdens religious exercise.  
The RFRA achieved bipartisan support from Congress with 
support ranging from conservatives such as Senator Orrin Hatch to 
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (2000) Findings.  
The Congress finds that— 
(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an 
unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the Constitution; 
(2) laws “neutral” toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws 
intended to interfere with religious exercise; 
(3) governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without compelling 
justification; 
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the Supreme Court 
virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious 
exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and  
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable 
test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior 
government interests. 
 18. Id. § 2000bb-1(a), (b) (2000). 
 19. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (where a burden is placed on the free exercise of religion, the 
government must demonstrate that it is the least restrictive means to meet a compelling 
interest). 
 20. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2000). The RFRA also provided a claim or defense to 
persons whose religious exercise has been substantially burdened by government action. Id. 
para. (2). 
 22. The RFRA provided that “Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise 
of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—(1) is in 
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2000). 
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liberals like Senators Edward Kennedy and Paul Wellstone.23 
Congress had little doubt that its broad measure to defend the public 
from any substantial burden on their free exercise of religion was 
within its power: 
[C]ongressional power under Section 5 to enforce the 14th 
amendment includes congressional power to enforce the free 
exercise clause. Because the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act is clearly designed to implement the free exercise clause—
to protect religious liberty and to eliminate laws “prohibiting 
free exercise of religion”—it falls squarely within Congress’ 
section 5 enforcement power.24 
Neither the broad nature of the RFRA nor its constitutionality was 
heavily debated.25  
The passage of RFRA illustrated the concern Congress had that 
some neutral laws, as upheld by courts, undermined the free exercise 
of religion by certain groups.26 When the Smith Court refused to 
utilize a high level of scrutiny in cases involving religious exercise,27 
Congress decided to intervene. The Smith decision, which refuses to 
protect religious exercise from burdensome laws of general 
applicability, held that protection from such laws could be 
accomplished through the political process.28 Hearings began in 1990 
 23. S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 2 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N 1892, 1893. 
 24. Id. at 14. 
 25. See id. at 18–24. Most of the debate centered around whether the bill would lead to an 
increase in prisoner litigation, from inmates challenging restrictions such as prison uniforms on 
free exercise grounds. Id. (additional views of Senator Simpson, the lone member of the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary to vote against sending the bill to the Senate for a vote). 
 26. See H.R. REP. 103-88 at 2 (1993) (citing written testimony of Professor Douglas 
Laycock before the House Civil and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee, May 14, 1992, at 2–
5). 
 27. 494 U.S. at 888. The Court found the test inappropriate because it would result in 
judicial determination of the centrality of religious beliefs to exercise of religion as well as the 
resulting anarchy from the inability of many current laws to withstand a heightened scrutiny 
analysis (including compulsory military service, cruelty to animals, child labor, etc). Id. 
 28. The Court pointed out that many states had made exceptions to their drug laws for 
sacramental peyote use. Id. at 890; see also, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-6(D) (Supp. 1989) 
(providing exception for sacramental peyote use). While leaving religious exercise exceptions 
in the political process may create a disadvantage for groups whose type of exercise is not 
widely practiced, it is a consequence of democratic government and a superior to judicial 
interpretation under a compelling interest test. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. 
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). Congress did not share the Court’s faith in the political 
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on predecessor bills to the RFRA, only months after the court 
announced the Smith decision.29  
The congressional theory behind the need for a compelling 
interest was that the Supreme Court had erred in leaving religious 
protection up to the political process.30 Furthermore, Congress 
believed the Court had failed to follow its own precedent that 
interpreted the Bill of Rights as requiring the withdrawal of certain 
subjects from political controversy so that fundamental rights, 
including the freedom to worship, would not depend on the outcome 
of elections.31 
To provide the greatest protection for religious exercise, Congress 
wanted the RFRA to be applied as broadly as possible.32 However, 
controversy arose regarding how strictly the compelling interest test 
should apply.33 The Act specifically called for the restoration of the 
test as applied in Sherbert and Yoder.34 There was contention over 
whether the standard applied in Sherbert and Yoder was in fact, more 
stringent than what had been applied to the cases between then and 
Smith.35 However, the specific references to the Sherbert and Yoder 
opinions indicate reliance on a strict application of the compelling 
process, finding that “[I]t is not feasible to combat the burdens of generally applicable laws on 
religion by relying upon the political process for the enactment of separate religious exemptions 
in every Federal, State, and local statute.” H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 6. In response to its 
feasibility concerns of specific legislation necessary to create religious exemptions for every 
neutral law, Congress was determined to allow RFRA to be applied as broadly as possible. Id. 
Thus, the RFRA encompassed “all cases where the free exercise of religion is substantially 
burdened.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. 
 29. See 101 H.R. 5377 § 2(b)(1)-(2) (1990). The proposed Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act of 1990 contains the same compelling interest test enacted in the RFRA. Cf. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000bb. 
 30. H.R. REP. NO. 103-88 at 6 (1993) (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 
U.S. 624, 638 (1943)). In Barnette, the Court struck a school board regulation requiring 
students to salute the American flag or face expulsion. Id. 
 31. Id.  
 32. H.R. Rep. 103-88 at 6. “[T]he definition of governmental activity covered by the bill 
is meant to be all inclusive.” Id.; see also supra note 28. 
 33. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 103-88 (1993). 
 34. See supra notes 20 and 21. 
 35. H.R. Rep. 103-88 at 15. Prior to the introduction of the RFRA to the 103d Congress, 
the committee made an effort to delete reference to the Sherbert and Yoder cases. Id. The House 
version when introduced to the House on March 11, 1993 replaced references to the Sherbert 
and Yoder opinions with text calling for the restoration of “the compelling interest test as set 
forth in Federal court cases before Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith.” H.R. 1308, 
§ 2(b)(1), 103d Cong. (1993) (as introduced in the House). 
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interest test.36 The RFRA would force courts to apply the test broadly 
and strictly.37  
Nonetheless, in 1997 the Supreme Court struck down the RFRA 
in City of Boerne v. Flores.38 In Boerne, an Archbishop applied for a 
building permit to enlarge a church in Boerne, Texas, to meet 
demand for a growing parish. However, the local authority, relying 
on a city ordinance regarding historic landmarks, denied the permit.39 
The Archbishop filed suit to challenge the denial of the permit and 
claimed the RFRA as a basis for relief.40 The District Court held the 
RFRA unconstitutional for exceeding the scope of Congress’s 
enforcement power under Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.41 The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding the RFRA 
constitutional.42 Subsequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth 
Circuit and invalidated the RFRA. Writing for the Court, Justice 
Kennedy noted that while the RFRA sought to instill a compelling 
interest test in cases such as Smith, the result would be “an anomaly 
in the law, a constitutional right to ignore neutral laws of general 
applicability.”43  
The Archbishop urged the Court to recognize the RFRA as 
legislation designed to protect liberties guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.44 The Court admitted that the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides “a positive grant of legislative power,” including the ability 
 36. 103 Pub. L. No. 141 § 2(b)(1). The RFRA as enacted into law contains the reference 
to the Sherbert and Yoder decisions. Id. 
 37. Cases with RFRA components appeared in a wide array of circumstances. See, e.g., In 
re Young, 89 F.3d 494 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that fraudulent transfers provision of U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code violates the RFRA for not recognizing special status of amounts tithed to a 
religious association as part of a sincere religious belief); Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883 
(9th Cir. 1995) (finding school’s total ban on weapons in violation of RFRA because it forced 
Khalsa Sikh children to choose between a fundamental religious tenet, carrying ceremonial 
knives, and expulsion); Muslim v. Frame, 897 F. Supp. 215 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (holding that 
RFRA applies to action challenging “no hats” rule in prison). 
 38. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id.  
 41. 877 F. Supp. 355, 357–58 (W.D. Tex 1995). 
 42. 73 F.3d 1352, 1364–65 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 43. 521 U.S. at 513. 
 44. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517. The Archbishop contended that “Section 5 includes the 
power to enact legislation designed to prevent, as well as remedy, constitutional violations [and] 
that Congress’s § 5 power is not limited to remedial or preventive legislation.” Id. 
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to use legislation to deter violations.45 However, the Court also found 
that Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment provides no authority 
for Congress to alter the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause by 
adding a constitutional right to ignore laws of general applicability.46 
Any substantive change made by Congress would be a separation of 
powers violation.47 
B. The Religious Liberty Protection Acts of 1998 and 1999 
After Boerne struck down the RFRA, Congress wasted little time 
in preparing a more narrowly applicable successor. The Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA),48 
contains a compelling interest test on substantial burdens to free 
exercise, similar to the RFRA.49 However, instead of broad 
applicability, RLUIPA is limited to land use decisions and 
institutionalized persons.50 Although Congress passed RLUIPA with 
 45. Id. (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966)). It is long established 
that preventive measures are sometimes appropriate as remedial measures if it is appropriate in 
the light of the evil sought to be cured. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 808. The Boerne Court 
reviewed the legislative history of the RFRA and found that the “legislative record lacks 
examples of modern instances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious 
bigotry.” Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530. Therefore, the Court argued, it was impossible to construe 
the RFRA as a remedial measure to end religious bigotry since the proposed means (the RFRA) 
were so out of proportion with the ends. Id. at 530–32. 
 46. Boerne, 521 U.S at 519. The Court felt that the line between what Congress is allowed 
to legislate under the Fourteenth Amendment (preventive and remedial measures) and what it is 
not allowed to legislate (substantive changes to the meaning) is not always clear. Id. at 519–20. 
However, by ensuring that there is a proportional relationship between the injury to be 
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to reach that end, Congress would avoid making 
any forbidden substantive changes. Id. 
 47. Id. at 520–29. Arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment did not give Congress 
authority to change the meaning of constitutional rights and allowing Congress to do so could 
make legislative acts superior to the constitution. Id. 
 48. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 
2000cc-5, 2000bb-2(1)–(2), (4), 2000bb-3(a)). 
 49. §§ 2000cc(a)(1), 2000cc-1(a). 
 50. Id. A land use regulation is defined as “a zoning or landmarking law, or the 
application of such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant’s use or development of land 
(including a structure affixed to land), if the claimant has an ownership, leasehold, easement, 
servitude, or other property interest in the regulated land or a contract or option to acquire such 
an interest.” § 2000cc-5(5).  
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wide bipartisan support, the switch from a broad approach under 
RFRA to the narrow approach of RLUIPA was not a swift one.51 
The first hearing was held less than three weeks after the Boerne 
decision was announced.52 The first fruit from Congress’s second 
attempt was the Religious Liberty Protection Act (RLPA) of 1998, 
which never made it out of committee. 
The RLPA of 1998 retained most of the RFRA’s broad reach,53 
but the Act also specifically addressed the creation of three 
restrictions on land use regulations.54 One of these restrictions revised 
the compelling interest test applicable to other laws under the Act by 
 51. See 146 CONG. REC. S7779, H7192 (2000) (daily ed. July 27, 2000). The effort 
toward passing RLUIPA began almost immediately after the Boerne decision struck down the 
RFRA. Roman P. Storzer & Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., The Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 929, 943 (2001). The House 
Judiciary Committee began hearings on alternatives to the RFRA almost immediately. Id. Bills 
were proposed in successive Congresses—the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998 and 
Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999. Id. The 1999 Act managed to pass the House, but was 
stalled in the Senate where opponents feared it could be used to avoid state anti-discrimination 
claims. Id.; see also Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999); 
Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998, S. 2148, 105th Cong. (1997); Religious Liberty 
Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. (1997). 
 52. Protecting Religious Freedoms After Boerne v. Flores, Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., July 
14, 1997. 
 53. H.R. 4019, § 2 states: 
 (a) GENERAL RULE.—Except as provided in subsection (b), a government shall 
not substantially burden a person’s religious exercise— 
 (1) in a program or activity, operated by a government, that receives Federal 
financial assistance; or 
 (2) in or affecting commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with 
Indian tribes; even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability. 
The bill also proposed to avoid invalidating laws of general applicability by allowing 
the government retaining the neutral policy, but exempting religious exercise from its 
enforcement. 
 54. Section 3(b)(1) created the following restrictions: 
(1) No government shall impose a land use regulation that— 
(A) substantially burdens religious exercise, unless the burden is the least restrictive 
means to prevent substantial and tangible harm to neighboring properties or to the 
public health or safety; 
(B) denies religious assemblies a reasonable location in the jurisdiction; or 
(C) excludes religious assemblies from areas in which nonreligious assemblies are 
permitted. 
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requiring only a showing that the regulation is the “least restrictive 
means to prevent substantial and tangible harm to neighboring 
properties or to the public health or safety.”55 
Congress’s next attempt was the Religious Liberty Protection Act 
of 1999.56 The RLPA of 1999 passed only the House. The proposed 
Act reinstated the least restrictive means in furtherance of a 
compelling interest test to land use regulations.57 However, the 
proposed Act also limited the applicability of the compelling interest 
test to cases where the “government has the authority to make 
individualized assessments of the proposed uses to which real 
property would be put.”58 
This limitation was included as a direct response to the Boerne 
decision.59 The House believed its hearing produced the necessary 
findings to support the use of the compelling interest test as a 
preventive remedial measure.60 Additionally, the House believed that 
the statutory wording would allow the RLPA of 1999 to be upheld as 
a proper exercise of the commerce and spending powers.61 
The RLPA of 1999 also imposed other restrictions on local land 
use control. These restrictions were based on discrimination against 
religious institutions.62 Instances of such discrimination would not 
 55. Id. 
 56. H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999). RLPA of 1999 passed the House, but was not voted 
on in the Senate. Id. RLPA of 1999 contains the same language of applicability as RLPA of 
1998. See supra note 48. 
 57. H.R. 1691 § 3(b)(1)(A); cf. H.R. 4019 § 3(b)(1)(A). 
 58. H.R. 1691 § 3(b)(1)(A). 
 59. H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 17 (1999). 
 60. Id. The Boerne Court argued that the use of the compelling interest test could only 
qualify as a valid remedial measure under Congress’s Section Five Enforcement Power if it was 
proportional. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. Congress based its findings on the 
Supreme Court decision in Smith, which implied that when government bodies have the 
authority to make decisions based on “individualized assessments,” they may not substantially 
burden an individual’s free exercise activities without a compelling interest. H.R. REP. NO. 
106-219, at 17; see also Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
884 (1990).  
 61. H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 35. 
 62. H.R. 1691 § 3(b)(1)(B) (“No government shall impose or implement a land use 
regulation in a manner that does not treat religious assemblies or institutions on equal terms 
with nonreligious assemblies or institutions.”), (C) (“No government shall impose or implement 
a land use regulation that discriminates against any assembly or institution on the basis of 
religion or religious denomination.”), (D) (“No government with zoning authority shall 
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result in application of a compelling interest test, instead such 
discrimination would be completely banned.63 
Although the RLPA of 1999 passed the House, the RLPA of 1999 
was not widely supported.64 Ten members of the House Committee 
on the Judiciary filed dissenting views.65 The dissenters supported the 
goal of providing greater protection for religious exercise, but 
believed that the RLPA of 1999 was a flawed vehicle for providing 
such protection.66 One group of dissenters argued that the RLPA of 
1999 did not cure the unconstitutionalities found in the RFRA.67 
These dissenters contended that the proposed law was not supported 
by enough evidence in the legislative history to be found proportional 
to the perceived discrimination, which was a necessary requirement 
to be constitutional under the Enforcement Powers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.68 These dissenters believed, moreover, in light of 
United States v. Lopez,69 the Supreme Court would likely strike the 
Act down as exceeding Congress’s Commerce Power. Finally, this 
group asserted that additional constitutional problems would arise 
under the Spending Clause70 and separation of powers doctrine.71  
unreasonably exclude from the jurisdiction over which it has authority, or unreasonably limit 
within that jurisdiction, assemblies or institutions principally devoted to religious exercise.”). 
 63. In relying on a proportionality test stated in Boerne, the proper remedy for such 
discrimination was to ban it altogether. H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 17; see also Boerne, 521 
U.S. 507, 519 (1997). 
 64. H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 17. 
 65. Id. at 32–42. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. at 32–39. 
 68. Id. at 34. Dissenters argued that the legislative history thus far bore a “striking 
similarity” to the record found insufficient in Boerne. Id. 
 69. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). In Lopez, the Court invalidated the Gun-
Free School Zone Act of 1990 because it exceeded Congress’s commerce power. Id. 
Previously, the Court had generally given deference to Congress’s determination of the reach of 
its Commerce Clause power, but in Lopez the Court declared that there must be a rational nexus 
between the Act and interstate commerce. Id. at 561. The dissenters argued that the RLPA of 
1999 failed the Lopez test because the act does not provide a facially valid interstate commerce 
nexus, meaning courts would have the incredulous task of providing preliminary hearings on 
whether the claimant has provided a great enough interstate commerce nexus to proceed on the 
merits. H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 35–36. Moreover, application of such hearings would result 
in biases toward larger religious groups more capable of providing a nexus. Id. 
 70. The RLPA applies to all “programs or activities” receiving federal financial 
assistance, but Congress’s Spending Clause power is limited to areas where legislation 
establishes a nexus between the conditions of accepting funds and the purpose of those funds. 
H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 36; see also South Dakota v. Dole, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding 
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The first group of dissenters joined with a second dissenting group 
in arguing that the broad nature of the RLPA of 1999 provided an 
unwarranted risk that religious groups would use the law to legalize 
discrimination.72 Additionally, the second group of dissenters claimed 
that the defects of the RLPA could be cured by adoption of an 
amendment offered by Representative Jerrold Nadler that would have 
prevented non-religious corporate entities from attacking civil rights 
laws through the RLPA of 1999.73 
II. A COMPROMISE IS REACHED AND THE RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND 
INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT IS BORN 
On July 13, 2000, Senators Orrin Hatch and Edward Kennedy 
introduced an amended version of the RLPA of 1999, known as 
RLUIPA.74 RLUIPA contains a jurisdictional underpinning distinct 
from the RFRA.75 RLUIPA’s scope is limited to state action aimed at 
land use decisions and persons in jails or mental facilities.76 The 
application of RLUIPA is limited to cases that affect federally 
financed programs, interstate and foreign commerce, or decisions 
that spending power was proper because a nexus existed between the conditions of federal 
funding and the purpose of federal funds). 
 71. The broad scope of the RLPA creates a separation-of-powers concern because it 
represents Congress’s attempt to overrule the Court on a constitutional interpretation. H.R. REP. 
NO. 106-219, at 37. 
 72. H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 39–41. Religious groups could claim that certain civil 
rights laws were a substantial burden on their religious exercise, thereby making protection of 
such rights rest on whether the government had a compelling interest in preventing such 
discrimination and whether the law is the least restrictive means. H.R. 1691 § 2(b)(1)-(2), 106th 
Cong. (1999); see also, e.g., Smith v. Employment & Hous. Comm’n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996) 
(government’s interest in providing equal housing opportunities for unmarried heterosexual 
couples is compelling); cf. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990) (no compelling 
government interest in preventing marital status discrimination). 
 73. H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 41–42. The dissenters argued that the proposed amendment 
would recognize a proper balance of individual rights, both those of free exercise of religion 
and the right to be free from unwarranted discrimination. Id. 
 74. 146 CONG. REC. S6687 (daily ed. July 13, 2000). The stated purpose of the RLUIPA 
was to “provide protection for houses of worship and other religious assemblies from restrictive 
land use regulation that often prevents the practice of faith.” Id. The Act achieved unanimous 
support in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. 146 CONG. REC. S7779 (daily ed. 
July 27, 2000); id. at H7192. 
 75. Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redev. Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1220–21 
(C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-1 (2000). 
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made as part of an individualized assessment.77 Essentially, 
RLUIPA’s jurisdiction limits enforcement to cases where Congress 
has power under the Commerce Clause, the Spending Clause, or 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.78 Congress believed the 
narrow scope of RLUIPA effectively limited the type of religious 
liberty protection it had sought to install in RFRA.79 
A. RLUIPA Heads to the Courts 
Although RLUIPA possessed support from a wide array of 
groups,80 many commentators were not convinced that RLUIPA had 
cured the unconstitutionality of the RFRA.81 When RLUIPA actions 
 77. Id. §§ 2000cc(a)(2). Applying RLUIPA to individualized assessments is a recognition 
of the Supreme Court’s holding in Smith that individualized assessments are subject to strict 
scrutiny. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990); 
see also Cottonwood Christian Ctr., 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1221 (Congress codified the 
individualized assessment jurisprudence of Free Exercise cases); Freedom Baptist Church of 
Del. County v. Township of Middletown, 204 F. Supp. 2d 857, 868 (E.D. Pa. 2002). “Since 
cases involving such individualized assessments are not ‘neutral laws of general 
applicability’—like the general prohibition against peyote use in Smith—the Act does not 
expand the application of the Free Exercise Clause, as did the RFRA, and so does not violate 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Storzer and Picarello, supra note 51, at 949. 
 78. 146 CONG. REC. E1563 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2000) (statements of Rep. Canady). 
 79. 146 CONG. REC. S7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000). Senator Hatch, among others, would 
have preferred a broader scope to the RLUIPA. Id. However, in order to achieve overwhelming 
bi-partisan support, he supported the narrow scope of RLUIPA. Id. In addition, the Justice 
Department was convinced that the narrow scope of RLUIPA would withstand Supreme Court 
scrutiny. Id.  
 80. 146 CONG. REC. S6688 (daily ed. July 13, 2000) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
RLUIPA has the support of the Free Exercise Coalition, which represents over fifty diverse and 
respected groups, including the Family Research Council, Christian Legal Society, American 
Civil Liberties Union, and People for the American Way. Id. The bill also has the endorsement 
of the Leadership Conference for Civil Rights. Id. The ACLU had opposed the proposed RLPA 
of 1999 because of its possible effects on civil rights laws, but supported the RLUIPA as a 
vehicle for restoring “[t]he balance between the needs of religion and the larger community’s 
concerns [which] has been off kilter for far too long.” ACLU, ACLU Hails Plans to Sign 
Religious Freedom Bill into Law, Sept. 22, 2000, available at http://aclu.org/religiousliberty/ 
religiousliberty.cfm?id=8122&c=142. However, the Municipal Art Society of New York 
described RLUIPA as a “‘Pandora’s box’ that . . . could greatly inhibit governments’ ability to 
protect the health, safety, and welfare of [its] citizens” and the Georgia Municipal Association 
called RLUIPA a “direct blow to local governments and to their authority to govern their 
communities.” Santoro, supra note 3, at 494–95. 
 81. Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good, 78 IND. L.J. 311 (2003); Ada-
Marie Walsh, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: Unconstitutional 
and Unnecessary, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 189 (2001); Gregory S. Walston, Federalism 
and Federal Spending, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 479 (2001);. Caroline R. Adams, Note, The 
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were first brought to the courts, the first defense for cities questioned 
the Act’s constitutionality.82 The courts, however, were willing to 
rule that RLUIPA was constitutional.83 Recently, the Supreme Court 
denied certiorari of a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision 
affirming RLUIPA’s constitutionality.84 Nevertheless, appeals of 
Constitutional Validity of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 70 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2361, 2392 (2002) (RLUIPA exceeds Congress’s Section Five Powers and 
is not a codification of Smith); Evan M. Shapiro, Note, The Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act: An Analysis Under the Commerce Clause, 76 WASH. L. REV. 
1255 (2001) (RLUIPA exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause).  
 Hamilton has criticized the RLUIPA as not being justified because of the lack of evidence 
that religious discrimination actually exists in land use decisions and that the RLUIPA unfairly 
favors churches over non-religious land uses. Marci Hamilton, FindLaw, Struggling with 
Churches as Neighbors (Jan. 17, 2002), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/ 
20020117.html; Marci Hamilton, The Federal Government's Intervention on Behalf of 
Religious Entities in Local Land Use Disputes (Nov. 6, 2003), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ 
hamilton/20031106.html. But see Storzer & Picarello, supra note 51 (RLUIPA is 
constitutional); Shawn Jensvold, Note, The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act of 2000 (RLUIPA): A Valid Exercise of Congressional Power?, 16 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 1, 35 
(2001) (RLUIPA’s land use provisions meet the concerns raised in Boerne and it is unlikely the 
Court would strike them down).  
 82. The first RLUIPA claim was filed mere hours after President Clinton signed the 
RLUIPA on September 22, 2000. Santoro, supra note 3, at 495. Shepherd Montessori Ctr. 
Milan v. Ann Arbor Charter Township, 675 N.W.2d 271 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003). The case 
concerned the plaintiff’s desire to operate a religious elementary school (kindergarten through 
third grade) in an area zoned as an office park and the defendant’s refusal to grant the necessary 
permits. Id. at 276. The trial court granted summary judgment for the township, citing a 
plaintiff’s failure to establish a prima facie case. Id. at 277. The Michigan Court of Appeals 
reversed, holding that a question of material fact existed as to whether the township’s denial 
was a substantial burden under 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(A) (2000). Id. at 289–90. 
 83. See, e.g., Murphy v. Zoning Comm’n of New Milford, 289 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D. Conn. 
2003) (RLUIPA does not exceed Congress’s powers under Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Westchester Day School v. Village of Mamaronek, 280 F. Supp. 2d 230, 235 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (same); Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redev. Agency, 218 F. Supp. 
2d 1203, 1221 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (RLUIPA is constitutional under the Commerce and Spending 
Clauses and to the extent RLUIPA is enacted under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
it merely codifies precedent); Freedom Baptist Church of Del. County v. Township of 
Middletown, 204 F. Supp. 2d 857 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (holding that Congress did not exceed its 
authority under the Commerce Clause). Only one judge has found RLUIPA to be 
unconstitutional in a land use context. See Elsinore Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 270 
F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (RLUIPA exceeds Congress’s power under Section 
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 84. Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002), certiorari denied, Alameida 
v. Mayweathers, 124 S. Ct. 66 (2003). In Mayweathers, the Ninth Circuit held that: (1) 
RLUIPA is a legitimate exercise of Congress’s spending powers; (2) RLUIPA does not violate 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment; (3) RLUIPA does not usurp state power 
under the Tenth Amendment; and (4) RLUIPA does not violate the Separation of Powers 
doctrine. 314 F.3d at 1066–70. 
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decisions finding RLUIPA constitutional are still pending in more 
than one circuit.85  
As more courts uphold the constitutionality of RLUIPA, questions 
regarding RLUIPA’s application have gained prominence. RLUIPA’s 
statutory language leaves much room for judicial interpretation.86 
Religious exercise is defined in RLUIPA as “any exercise of religion, 
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religion.”87 
The only other definition contained in the statutory language states 
that the use of a building or real property for the purpose of religious 
exercise is considered a religious exercise.88  
As part of the prima facie case, a court must consider whether the 
disputed land use regulation substantially burdens religious exercise 
before the court can determine whether the government’s actions 
represented both a compelling interest and the least restrictive means 
of furthering that purpose.89 There is no statutory definition of 
 85. See rluipa.com. The website, funded by the Beckett Fund for Religious Liberty, 
provides updates on many pending RLUIPA lawsuits (last visited May 17, 2005). 
 86. § 2000cc(a)(1). In applying RLUIPA to land use disputes courts must interpret the 
following statutory language: 
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that 
imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a 
religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition 
of the burden on that person, assembly, or institution—(A) is in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering 
that compelling governmental interest.  
Id. 
 87. Id. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).  
 88. Id. § 2000cc-5(7)(B). A variety of activities have been found to be “religious 
exercises” for the purposes of the RLUIPA. See, e.g., Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 961 
(10th Cir. 2001) (pastoral visits by Christian pastors to institutionalized persons); Cottonwood 
Christian Ctr., 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1224 (seeking to build a church); Murphy v. Zoning Comm’n 
of Town of New Milford, 148 F. Supp. 2d 173, 188–89 (D. Conn. 2001) (prayer groups at a 
private home); Dilaura v. Ann Arbor Charter Township, 30 Fed. Appx. 501, 509 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(same). 
 89.  
In order to establish a prima facie case that RLUIPA has been violated, a plaintiff must 
present evidence that the land use regulation in question: (1) imposes a substantial 
burden; (2) on the ‘religious exercise;’ (3) of a person, institution, or assembly . . . . If 
the plaintiff makes this prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the local government 
to demonstrate that the land use regulation furthers a compelling governmental interest 
and that the land use regulation is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. 
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“substantial burden.”90 However, the legislative history of RLUIPA 
indicates that Congress intended “substantial burden” to mean the 
same as the Supreme Court’s definition in the Court’s free exercise 
jurisprudence.91 The Supreme Court’s definition of a “substantial 
burden” incorporates the pressure to make a person, group, or 
religious institution act contrary to their religious beliefs.92 
Specifically, land use regulations that merely economically or 
otherwise inconvenience a religious institution are not considered to 
substantially burden religious exercise.93 Furthermore, while affected 
religious beliefs do not need to be either fundamental or a central 
tenet to the exercise of a religion, affected beliefs cannot be 
incidental to religious exercise.94 In applying RLUIPA, lower courts 
have interpreted this language either strictly or liberally.95  
Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 235 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1193–94 (D. Wyo. 
2002); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2000).  
 90. See Grace United Methodist Church, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 1194 (stating that RLUIPA 
does not define what constitutes a substantial burden). 
 91. 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000). In a joint statement Senators Hatch 
and Kennedy, cosponsors of RLUIPA, wrote: 
The Act does not include a definition of the term “substantial burden” because it is not 
the intent of this Act to create a new standard for the definition of “substantial burden” 
on religious exercise. Instead, that term as used in the Act should be interpreted by 
reference to Supreme Court jurisprudence. Nothing in this Act, including the 
requirement in Section 5(g) that its terms be broadly construed, is intended to change 
that principle. The term “substantial burden” as used in this Act is not intended to be 
given any broader interpretation than the Supreme Court's articulation of the concept 
of substantial burden or religious exercise.  
Id. 
 92. Lyng v. N.W. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 450–51 (1988) (a 
government action is a substantial burden to a religious activity when it has the tendency to 
coerce individuals into acting contrary to their beliefs); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. 
Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717–18 (1981) (substantial burden exists where the 
government puts “substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his 
beliefs”). 
 93. Henderson v. Kennedy, 265 F.3d 1072, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Grace United 
Methodist Church, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 1195. In Henderson, the Federal Circuit held that a 
regulation, which prohibited plaintiffs from selling t-shirts on the National Mall, did not 
substantially burden religious exercise. 
 94. RLUIPA’s definition of religious exercise is broad: 
 (A) . . . The term `religious exercise' includes any exercise of religion, whether or 
not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief. 
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The Seventh Circuit has taken a very strict approach to what 
constitutes a substantial burden.96 The court has refused to grant 
RLUIPA protection to any difficulties, such as the scarcity of 
affordable land within areas with acceptable zoning, procedural 
requirements, and the inherent political aspects of any special use 
permit application.97 In taking such a strict interpretation, the court 
recognizes that “the harsh reality of the marketplace sometimes 
dictates that certain facilities are not available to those who desire 
them.”98  
In Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne,99 the 
court denied summary judgment for the church, who was seeking to 
build a daycare facility in a residential zoned area that did not allow 
such uses. The court found that the Cheyenne zoning code did not 
 (B) . . . The use, building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious 
exercise shall be considered to be religious exercise of the person or entity that uses or 
intends to use the property for that purpose. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(7). 
 In context of the broad definition of religious exercise, a land use regulation that imposes a 
substantial burden on religious exercise must be a regulation that “necessarily bears direct, 
primary, and fundamental responsibility for rendering religious exercise—including the use of 
real property for the purpose thereof within the regulated jurisdiction generally—effectively 
impracticable. Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th 
Cir. 2003). 
 95. Although RLUIPA does not define substantial burden, legislative history indicates 
that the same substantial burden test under the RFRA should apply. 146 CONG. REC. E1563 
(daily ed. Sept. 22, 2000).  
 96. See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers, 342 F.3d at 752. 
 97. Id. at 761. In this case, an association of area churches sued the city of Chicago, 
claiming its ordinance requiring special use approval for churches to operate in commercial and 
business areas violated RLUIPA. Id. The court disagreed with the plaintiffs and held that 
RLUIPA could not be used to grant religious users an exemption from land use regulations. Id. 
 Courts that have not found in favor of churches on RLUIPA disputes often find that land 
use regulation does not present a substantial burden. See, e.g., Davis v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 
797 N.E.2d 548, 552 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (off-street parking restrictions did not substantially 
burden church); N. Pac. Union Conference Ass’n of the Seventh Day Adventists v. Clark 
County, 74 P.3d 140, 147 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (regulation that prevented church from 
constructing administration building on land zoned for agricultural uses does not represent a 
substantial burden). 
 98. Id.; see also Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961) (“It is well established 
that there is no substantial burden placed on an individual’s free exercise of religious where a 
law or policy merely operates to make the practice of the individual’s religious beliefs more 
expensive.”). 
 99. Grace United Methodist Church v. City Of Cheyenne, 235 F. Supp. 2d 1186 (D. Wyo. 
2002). 
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substantially burden the church in the sense that it put “substantial 
pressure on Grace United to modify its behavior or violate its 
religious beliefs.”100 The court held that the city’s zoning code, at 
most, placed one restriction on a multitude of means by which Grace 
United could engage in its religious vocation.101 
Other courts have followed a more liberal approach. For example, 
one court held that a substantial burden existed because a church 
needed a larger facility to meet as one body (as its religious tenets 
instruct).102 Although the church had spent money preparing the 
application materials for a conditional use permit, the church had not 
begun construction nor was there a showing that other tracts of land 
were not available to build a larger facility.103 Another court found a 
substantial burden in siding with a Jewish Day School’s wish to 
expand because the necessary modifications were necessary and in 
furtherance of the school’s mission of providing a religious 
education.104 This version of the substantial burden test appears to 
both broaden the concept of central religious belief and blur the line 
between inconvenience and interference.  
 100. Id. at 1197. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Supra note 1 and accompanying text.  
 103. Id. Eventually the city and the church reached a settlement agreement in which the 
city bought the church’s land and the church bought another large tract to build a new facility. 
Mark A. Spykerman & Daniel R. Mandelker, RECENT CASES IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT 
WON (USUALLY), AM. LAW INST. (2003), available at Westlaw: SJ015 ALI-ABA 71; cf. San 
Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 2002 WL 971770 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2002) (finding 
that the Christian college could not demonstrate a substantial burden on its religion because 
having the college in that particular area was not a religious experience mandated by the 
plaintiff’s fate). 
 104. Westchester Day School v. Vill. of Mamorneck, 280 F. Supp. 2d 230, 241 (S.D.N.Y 
2003). The school’s mission was to provide a dual curriculum of secular and Judaic studies. Id. 
The proposed modifications included the addition of a chapel, but also that of a library, music 
room, art room, and cafeteria. Id.  
 The outcomes in Cottonwood and Westchester Day School appear contrary to what courts 
insisting on a strict interpretation would have found. Compare Cottonwood and Westchester 
Day School with Vineyard Christian Fellowship v. City of Evanston, 250 F. Supp. 2d 961, 991 
(2003) (court could not say that the church was substantially burdened).  
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III. USING RLUIPA TO FAIRLY ADJUDICATE LAND USE DISPUTES 
INVOLVING RELIGIOUS ENTITIES 
Land use is fundamentally a local issue.105 When a locality 
designs a zoning ordinance or approves a special use permit, it is the 
locality and its residents that must live adjacent to the uses. Often, 
localities have legitimate reasons for regulating the location of 
religious uses. For example, churches can bring traffic and parking 
problems to quiet residential neighborhoods that zoning ordinances 
are meant to protect.106  
Religious land use decisions often result in negotiations between a 
church and the locality. A locality must feel comfortable with the 
impacts a particular religious use may have on the surrounding 
community. In most religious land use decisions, compromises are 
inevitably made. Localities will usually grant permission for the 
religious use on the condition of mitigating some of the impacts to 
the surrounding neighborhood, such as providing enough off street 
parking.107 RLUIPA cases typically arise when neither the locality 
nor the religious group is willing to compromise by refusing permits 
or refusing to mitigate the locality’s concerns.108 RLUIPA is meant to 
respect the tradition of local control that, for the most part, includes a 
choice not to compromise with a religious use, and only limit local 
control when it has the effect of substantially burdening free 
exercise.109 
 105. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). Furthermore, the Court 
will generally interpret the laws affecting local land use decisions to preserve local authority 
rather than override it. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (refusing to interpret provision of the Clean Water Act to alter 
the traditional power and responsibility of the state in land use decisions). 
 106. See, e.g., Murphy v. Zoning Comm’n of New Milford, 289 F. Supp. 2d 87, 108 (D. 
Conn. 2003) (A compelling interest exists in “enforcing the town’s zoning regulations and 
ensuring the safety of residential neighborhoods.”). 
 107. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD R. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.12 (6th ed.) 
(2000). Often zoning ordinances require that churches obtain a special use or conditional use 
permit in order to develop, improve, or use a structure within a certain zoned district.  
 108. Religious uses should not bring RLUIPA claims until they have reasonably pursued 
compromises with local officials. SIDLEY AUSTIN BROWN & WOOD’S RELIGIOUS INSTS. GROUP 
& RLUIPA LITIG. TASK FORCE, QUESTIONS & ANSWERS ABOUT THE FEDERAL RELIGIOUS 
LAND USE LAW OF 2000, at 6, available at http://sidley.com/db30/cgi-bin/pubs/web% 
20version%20of%20rluipa %20booklet.pdf (last visited May 17, 2005). 
 109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a)(1) (2000). The legislative history of RLUIPA makes clear 
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The fairness in RLUIPA application depends on the court’s 
definition of a substantial burden. After the RFRA was ruled 
unconstitutional and measures to pass a RLPA were muttled by 
questions of its constitutionality, the framers of RLUIPA were careful 
to ensure that the Act would not suffer the same fate as its 
predecessors.110 In doing so, RLUIPA was not meant to make 
religious entities immune to the enforcement of generally applicable 
land use laws or individualized land use decisions disfavoring a 
specific religious use.111  
A fair application of RLUIPA exists only when a strict definition 
of “substantial burden” is met.112 A strict definition of “substantial 
burden” ensures that religious uses will only receive RLUIPA 
protection when a locality’s land use decision knowingly 
discriminates or has the effect of discrimination against a religious 
use.113 There is no question that purposeful religious discrimination in 
that the Act is not intended to give religious uses immunity from traditional local control. 146 
CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (“This Act does not provide religious institutions 
with immunity from land use regulation, nor does it relieve religious institutions from applying 
for variances, special permits or exceptions, hardship approval, or other relief provisions in land 
use regulations, where available without discrimination or unfair delay.”). 
 110. RFRA was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores, 
521 U.S. 507 (1997). The Boerne Court felt that the effect of RFRA in legalizing otherwise 
illegal behavior if it stymied religious exercise was not a proportional response to the record’s 
evidence of religious discrimination. Id. Those legislators against the 1999 RLPA viewed it as a 
flawed vehicle for religious protection. See supra notes 65–68. After the learning experiences 
with the RFRA and RLPAs, RLUIPA’s framers were careful to present the Act as only an effort 
to protect religious entities from discriminatory land use decisions and not to give them an 
advantage over non-religious uses. 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000). 
 111. See supra note 109. 
 112. See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 U.S. 752, 761–62 (7th 
Cir. 2003). The strict definition of “substantial burden” has the effect of preventing successful 
RLUIPA claims when the effect of a local land use decision merely makes it more expensive or 
inconvenient for a religious use to locate in an area. Id. If “substantial burden” is not held to 
such a strict definition, the result would be an unfair advantage to religious uses over non-
religious uses (comparable non-religious uses would still be subject to the same land use 
control, while religious uses would be effectively exempt. Id.  
 113. A court, in deciding whether a land use decision that prevented construction of a faith-
based elementary school represented a “substantial burden”, gave a list of factors that should be 
considered: 
Whether the are alternate locations in the area that would allow the school consistent 
with zoning laws; the actual availability of alternate property, either by sale or lease; 
the availability of property suitable for a K-3 school; the proximity of the homes of 
parents who would send their children; and the economic burdens of alternate 
locations.  
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a land use context is constitutionally suspect.114 Effective 
discrimination occurs when cities unreasonably limit religious uses 
through seemingly neutral zoning codes or individualized land use 
decisions.115 
Liberal and more stretching definitions of “substantial burden” are 
more likely to result in decisions that overrule local land use 
decisions affecting religious uses even though a comparable non-
religious use would find the local decision binding.116 While, a strict 
definition of substantial burden might also lead to scenarios where 
RLUIPA might work to give a religious use an advantage not enjoyed 
by a non-religious use, such scenarios will be rare and limited to 
cases in which the advantage given to the religious use is necessary to 
avoid a substantial burden. This might occur, for example, when a 
city tries to prevent religious services from being held within walking 
distance of a heavily Orthodox Jewish neighborhood.117 
Moreover, questions of constitutional validity will more likely 
plague RLUIPA if a liberal definition of “substantial burden” is 
regularly applied. The liberal definition likely sparks equal protection 
attacks on the constitutionality of RLUIPA or opens the door to the 
same constitutional attacks that the Supreme Court espoused in 
Shepard Montessori Ctr. Milan v. Ann Arbor Charter Township, 675 N.W.2d 271 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 2003). Consideration of these factors will allow for a judge or jury to decide whether the 
local land use decision was merely an inconvenience to the religious use or constituted an actual 
“substantial burden” in the sense that it actually interfered with religious exercise to the point of 
making constructing a functioning faith based school a practical impossibility. Id.  
 114. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) 
(local ordinances that make classifications based on religion are suspect). 
 115. H.R. 106-219 at 20. Effective discrimination often occurs without any discriminatory 
intent by a city. An example would be a built suburb limiting new churches to only residential 
zones, when the actual ability to build in a residential lot would involve buying multiple 
adjacent lots and tearing down the homes to secure enough land to build a church. Douglas 
Laycock, Symposium: State RFRAs and Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 755, 761 
(1999). The court in Shepard Montessori Ctr. identified actual availability of land as a factor in 
determining a substantial burden. See supra note 104. 
 116. Compare Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752 (7th 
Cir. 2002) (finding no substantial burden) with Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redev. 
Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (finding a substantial burden). 
 117. Joel Rubin, House of Prayer Splits Neighbors, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2003, at B1 
(article describing how “Orthodox Jews’ use of a residentially zoned house in upscale Hancock 
Park as a Synagogue, and their plan to build another nearby, prompt area residents to file 
suit.”). Id. 
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Boerne.118 Favoring religious uses equates to disfavoring uses for not 
being religious. This could be construed as a clear violation of equal 
protection.119 It would also strengthen the attacks of some 
commentators who believe RLUIPA violates the Establishment 
Clause and principles of Federalism.120 
Perhaps the most fearsome effect of a liberal approach defining 
“substantial burden” would be the creation of a feeling of 
omnipotence over land use decisions by religious uses. Localities 
seeking to mitigate harms caused by religious uses would risk 
RLUIPA litigation. Following the decision in Cottonwood, would 
RLUIPA protection extend to religious groups which wash to prevent 
a city from limiting on street parking because it would substantially 
burden the ability of the congregation to attend church? 121 
Contrary to the liberal approach, a strict definition of “substantial 
burden” will actually foster compromise and negotiation between 
localities and religious groups. Localities will be aware that they 
cannot set up so many restrictions as to effectively zone out religious 
uses from an area. Religious groups will be aware that RLUIPA will 
not give the unfettered power to ignore local land use decisions. The 
result is that both the locality and religious groups will be motivated 
to find a solution that protects the central tenets inherent in the 
religious use while causing the least negative effects to the 
surrounding community. Furthermore, religious entities can still 
 118. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). 
 119. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2000). RLUIPA, itself prohibits treating religious uses 
on unequal terms than non religious uses. Id. (This provision essentially codifies equal 
protection jurisprudence on governmental distinctions based on religion.) 
 120. See, e.g., Marcie A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 
319–23 (2003). 
 121. The Cottonwood court found a substantial burden existed because RLUIPA defines 
the “[t]he use, building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise” as 
the exercise that cannot be substantially burdened absent a compelling interest. Since 
Cottonwood had thousands of members the burden was more substantial, and the time involved 
in obtaining the Cottonwood property. 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1226–27. The Court made no inquiry 
into the availability of other land (the church drew its members from a wide geographic area so 
a reasonable area in which alternate land could be available would be quite large), nor the 
economic burden of finding an alternate location. Id. Though, the Court quotes precedent that a 
“substantial burden” cannot be just a convenience, it gives no analysis into the difference 
between the two terms. Id. at 1226. Failure to determine a difference between an inconvenience 
and an actual “substantial burden” will result in the very immunity to generally applicable laws 
and negative land use decisions that were not intended by the RLUIPA. See supra note 109. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol18/iss1/13
p291 Spykerman book pages.doc  11/2/2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005]  When God and Costco Battle for a City’s Soul 313 
 
 
 
protect themselves from land use decisions made in bad faith by 
localities under the normal system of challenges to local land use 
decisions.122 
CONCLUSION 
Congress has decided that religious exercise needs further 
protection from certain generally applicable laws and individualized 
assesments that might effect free exercise. After its initial attempt 
was rebuked by the Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores,123 
Congress reacted with a new law, RLUIPA,124 which was more 
narrow in scope than the RFRA in order to meet the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional concerns. The narrow scope of RLUIPA applied only 
to local land use decisions and institutionalized persons. In the land 
use context, RLUIPA made local decisions that “substantially 
burden” religious exercise invalid unless they were for a “compelling 
governmental reason” and represented “the least restrictive” 
alternative.125 
In applying RLUIPA to local land use decisions, it is clear that 
only a strict definition of “substantial burden” can respect local 
control, avoid constitutional challenges and create a level of fairness 
between localities and religious uses. Moreover, employing a strict 
definition of “substantial burden” will result in both the locality and 
the religious entity being motivated to seek a compromise that 
protects central religious beliefs, but respects a locality’s concern 
over the effects a religious practice or use may have on the 
neighboring community.  
 122. Localities generally provide for challenges to land use decisions within their city 
codes. Upon a final local decision, aggrieved parties can also seek judicial review. See, e.g., 
Fox v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Barkhamsed, 854 A.2d 806 (Conn. Ct. App. 2004). A 
religious use might also sue under § 1983 if it can allege a violation of constitutional rights. See 
generally 30 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 503 (2004). 
 123. 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see also supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 124. § 2000cc(a)(1)(A)–(B). 
 125. Id. 
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